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ABSTRACT: According to the traditional requirement, formulated by William Whewell in his account of the “consil-
ience of inductions” in 1840, a scientific hypothesis should have unifying power in the sense that it explains 
and predicts several mutually independent phenomena. Variants of this notion of consilience or unification 
include deductive, inductive, and approximate systematization. Inference from surprising phenomena to their 
theoretical explanations was called abduction by Charles Peirce. As a unifying theory is independently testable 
by new kinds of phenomena, it should also receive confirmation from its empirical success. The study of the 
prospects of probabilistic Bayesianism to motivate this kind of criterion for abductive confirmation is shown to 
lead to two quite distinct conceptions of unification, linking up and screening off, and in both cases the unify-
ing theory can be seen to receive probabilistic support from empirical phenomena.
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RESUMEN: De acuerdo con un requisito tradicional, formulado por William Whewell en su explicación de la «con-
siliencia de las inducciones» en 1840, una hipótesis científica debería tener poder unificador, en el sentido 
de que explique y prediga varios fenómenos mutuamente independientes. Las variantes de esta noción de 
consiliencia o unificación incluyen la sistematización deductiva, inductiva y aproximada. Charles Peirce 
llamó abducción a la inferencia que va de fenómenos sorprendentes hasta sus explicaciones teóricas. Puesto 
que una teoría unificadora puede contrastarse independientemente a partir de nuevas clases de fenómenos, 
también debería recibir confirmación a partir de su éxito empírico. Se muestra que el estudio de las perspec-
tivas del bayesianismo probabilístico para motivar este tipo de criterio para la confirmación abductiva con-
duce a dos concepciones distintas de la unificación, vinculación (linking up) y anulación (screening off), y en 
ambos casos puede observarse que la teoría unificadora recibe apoyo probabilístico a partir de fenómenos 
empíricos.
Palabras clave: abducción, confirmación, consiliencia, poder explicativo, sistematización, contrastación, unificación.
1. Whewell on Consilience
It is often required that a scientifically interesting hypothesis has to explain several mu-
tually independent phenomena, thereby showing that these phenomena are effects of a 
hypothetical common causal principle or a postulated unobservable entity (see Schurz 
2008a).This idea is historically related to the classical exposition of the method of hypoth-
esis by William Whewell in The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences in 1840. According to 
* I am grateful to Gerhard Schurz for illuminating discussions on unification and to anonymous referees 
of this journal for useful comments.
108 Ilkka Niiniluoto
Theoria 31/1 (2016): 107-123
Whewell, explanatory scientific hypotheses are discovered by induction to account for phe-
nomena, but they should be testable by new kinds of predictions:
The hypothesis which we accept ought to explain phenomena which we have observed. But 
they ought to do more than this: our hypothesis ought to fortel phenomena which have not yet 
been observed; - at least of the same kind as those which the hypothesis was invented to explain. 
...But the evidence in favour of our induction is of a much higher and more forcible character 
when it enables us to explain and determine cases of a kind different from those which were con-
templated in the formation of our hypothesis. (Whewell 1847, 62-65)
Charles S. Peirce agreed with Whewell that scientific hypotheses, which are first inferred 
by abduction as explanations of surprising phenomena (CP 5.189), should be subjected 
to the test of experiment by deducing from them “most unlikely experiental predictions” 
(CP 7.182). Also Karl Popper repeated Whewell’s view in his requirement that a new the-
ory should be independently testable: “it must have new and testable consequences (prefer-
ably consequences of a new kind)” (Popper 1963, 241) (cf. Niiniluoto 1984, 37-38).
Whewell argued further that the strongest sign of scientific progress occurs with “the 
consilience of inductions”, where “an induction, obtained from one class of facts, coin-
cides with an induction, obtained from another class”. In consilience, inductions “jump to-
gether”: two separate generalizations are found to be consequences of the same comprehen-
sive theory. His paradigmatic example was Newton’s mechanics which was able to explain 
Galileo’s and Kepler’s empirical laws and many other apparently unconnected phenomena 
like the perturbations of the moon and planets by the sun and the precession of the equi-
noxes. Whewell illustrated the historical development of sciences by “inductive tables” 
which look like inverted genealogical trees, with the most general and powerful theory as 
the trunk – the theory of universal gravitation in the case of astronomy, and the undulatory 
theory of light in the case of optics. These inductive tables show how the truths of these sci-
ences “tend to simplicity” and “converge to unity”.
Whewell regarded consilience as “a test of the theory in which it occurs”, or “a criterion 
of its reality, which has never yet been produced in favour of falsehood”. Whewell seems to 
propose here an optimistic meta-induction from the history of science, claiming that con-
silience has always brought about true theories. Even though Whewell admitted that in-
complete and even erroneous hypotheses “may often be of service to science”, his claim 
about certainty due to consilience is clearly exaggerated. Any fallibilist, who follows Peirce 
in thinking that all scientific conclusions are uncertain and corrigible (CP 1.149), has to 
admit that theoretical unification in science has led to errors as well. The discovery of rela-
tivity theory and quantum theory in the early twentieth century shows that even Newton’s 
long admired theory is not strictly speaking true but at best approximately true or truthlike 
(cf. Niiniluoto 1999a).
Whewell’s notions of explanation and prediction are deductive, so that his inductions 
are converse deductions: an inductively inferred theory “subordinates” or “colligates” a class 
of facts as its instances. Peirce’s account of abduction, as inference to a theory, allows the 
theory to give probabilistic explanations as well (see Niiniluoto 1999b). Another relevant 
extension is the notion of approximate explanation and prediction (cf. Section 5).
Some sceptical anti-realists have suggested against Whewell and Peirce that the success 
of scientific theories in explanation and prediction does not in any way indicate that these 
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theories are true (in the realist sense of correspondence with reality) or that the postulated 
theoretical entities exists in reality. For example, Bas van Fraassen (1989) proposes to con-
clude only that successful theories are empirically adequate (i.e., all of their observable con-
sequences are true). Larry Laudan (1990), who thinks that truth is a utopian aim of science, 
is still willing to speak about the empirical support or confirmation of theories, but for him 
such support of a theory concerns only its reliability (i.e., true expectations about its next 
observable predictions).
It is therefore important to ask four questions: What adequacy conditions does the no-
tion of confirmation satisfy? (see Section 2). How can one measure the strength of the em-
pirical support or confirmation that a theory receives from its successful explanations and 
predictions? (see Section 3). How does this confirmation depend on the unifying power of 
the theory? (see Section 4).
2. Inductive and Abductive Confirmation
Carl G. Hempel’s important contribution in the 1940s was the idea of analysing the con-
cept of empirical confirmation by qualitative or structural principles (see Hempel 1965). 
One intuitive notion is to regard confirmation as a weakening of the relation of logical con-
sequence or deductive entailment: according to the Entailment condition, if an observation 
report entails a hypothesis, it also confirms the hypothesis.
(E) If evidence E logically entails hypothesis H, then E confirms H.
As entailment itself is transitive, one may also suggest that confirmation is transmitted to 
logical consequences. This is the Special Consequence principle:
(SC) If evidence E confirms hypothesis H, and K is entailed by H, then E confirms K.
Another idea is related to confirmation by hypothetico-deductive testing, where we check 
whether the observable consequences of a hypothesis are true or not. In the negative case, 
the hypothesis is refuted, and in the positive case, the hypothesis is confirmed. Thus, ac-
cording to the Converse Entailment condition,
(CE) If hypothesis H logically entails non-tautological evidence E, then E confirms H.
For example, if theory H achieves deductive systematization between empirical statements 
E and E’, i.e., H & ECE’ and not ECE’, then HC(E → E’), so that E → E’ confirms H by CE 
(see Hempel, 1965). By the Converse Consequence condition, evidence confirming a hy-
pothesis also confirms all logically stronger hypotheses:
(CC) If K logically entails H and E confirms H, then E confirms K.
Hempel further observed that CC and SC are incompatible, since a notion of confirmation 
satisfying both of them would be trivial in the sense that any statement confirms any other 
statement, and concluded that CC is not “a sound general condition of adequacy” (ibid., 
p. 33). The same holds for the pair CE and SC.
Howard Smokler (1968) noted that E and SC are typical in enumerative and elimina-
tive induction, where a generalization receives empirical support from its positive instances. 
On the other hand, he proposed that CE and CC are satisfied by “abductive inference”, 
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where a hypothetical theory is supported by its power to explain surprising phenomena. 
This is in line with Peirce’s famous formulation of abduction or the “operation of adopting 
an explanatory hypothesis”:
(PA)  The surprising fact E is observed;
But if H were true, E would be a matter of course.
Hence, there is reason to suspect that H is true.
(CP 5.189). This schema shows how a hypothetical theory can be “abductively conjec-
tured” if it accounts “for the facts or some of them”.
The straightforward definition of “deductive confirmation” (E confirms H iff H en-
tails E) would satisfy Smokler’s conditions CE and CC.1 But these adequacy conditions 
have been criticized for allowing confirmation too easily, since entailment is monotonic 
and thus admits arbitrary strengthening of the premise (i.e., if HCE, then H&KCE for any 
K; hence, if E deductively confirms H, it also deductively confirms H&K for any K). More 
plausible versions of these principles —call them CE* and CC*— are obtained by replacing 
deductive entailment C by the stronger condition of deductive explanation. Define abduc-
tive confirmation by
(AC) E abductively confirms H iff H deductively explains E,
where H is consistent and E is non-tautologous. Then confirmation defined by (AC) satis-
fies the central principle CE*, but not generally CC*. (See Niiniluoto and Tuomela, 1973, 
227).2 While (AC) is in line with Peirce’s account of abduction (PA), it should be general-
ized to cover cases of inductive-probabilistic explanation as well.
The incompatibility of conditions of CE and SC has an important consequence to the 
once popular transitivity interpretation of Whewell’s consilience of inductions (see Hesse 
1974, 141-146; Niiniluoto and Tuomela 1973, 228-230).3 Assuming that a theory H en-
tails empirical statements or regularities E and E’, some authors suggested that direct evi-
dence for E (or E itself) counts via H as indirect evidence for E’ (see Kneale 1949, 108; 
Nagel 1961, 64-65). However, such an argument would apply first CE in concluding that E 
confirms H and then SC in concluding that E confirms E’. As CE and SC cannot be satis-
fied at the same time, this kind of argument presupposes wrong kinds of transitivity prop-
erties for the notion of confirmation.
1 The concept of conditional deductive confirmation of H by E can be defined by the requirement that 
there is an observational statement C such that H achieves deductive systematization between C and 
E, i.e., H&CCE. To avoid the trivial choice of C as H → E, one should require that C is logically inde-
pendent of H (see Kuipers, 2000, 36).
2 The concept of deductive explanation is much stronger than merely deductive relations between 
statements, as one should rule out self-explanations and demand that general premises are lawlike. 
Further, the explanans should be ontologically or causally prior to the explanandum. Similarly, in-
ductive-probabilistic explanations presuppose laws with objective probabilities or propensities (see 
Fetzer, 1981). 
3 We have seen in Section 1 that this was not Whewell’s own interpretation, as consilience for him pro-
vided an argument in favour of the unifying theory H. See also Section 4.
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3. Bayesian Confirmation
The Bayesian approach analyses inferences in terms of epistemic probabilities which ex-
press coherent degrees of belief of rational agents. Bayes’s Theorem
(B) P(H/E) =
 
P(H)P(E/H)
P(E)
tells how prior probabilities P(H) of hypotheses are transformed to posterior probabili-
ties P(H/E) via the likelihood P(E/H). While for subjectivists such probabilities are per-
sonal degrees of belief, systems of inductive logic include more objective ways of allocating 
probabilities to statements expressible within a language (for an overview, see Gabbay et 
al. 2011). The Bayesians can also employ objective physical probabilities especially in their 
treatment of likelihoods P(E/H) and probabilistic laws.
If confirmation is explicated by the High Probability criterion (E confirms H iff 
P(H/E) is sufficiently high, i.e. larger than some threshold q above .5), then conditions of 
Entailment E and Special Consequence SC are satisfied. This follows from the facts that 
ECH implies P (H/E) = 1 and HCK implies P(H/E) ≤ P(K/E). On the other hand, Con-
verse Entailment CE and Converse Consequence CC are not satisfied. This notion of 
HP-confirmation thus fits the idea of enumerative inductive inference.
Another definition of incremental confirmation is the Positive Relevance criterion 
(E confirms H iff P(H/E) > P(H); E disconfirms H iff P(H/E) < P(H)). Here PR-con-
firmation means that evidence E increases the rational degree of belief in the truth of hy-
pothesis H. Now the principle CE receives immediately a justification by Bayes’s Theo-
rem (B):
(1) If H logically entails E, where P(H) > 0 and P(E) < 1, then P(H/E) > P(H).
This result is completely general in the sense that it is valid for all epistemic probabil-
ity measures P, which satisfy the probability axioms, and for all non-zero prior probabili-
ties P(H). On the other hand, Positive Relevance does not generally satisfy the controver-
sial principle CC, since P(K/E) may be small and even zero in the case where KCH and 
P(H/E) > P(H).Still, one might defend the modified principle CC* for cases where expla-
nation is transitive (see Niiniluoto, 2007).
As positive relevance is a symmetric relation, P(H/E) > P(H) holds if and only if 
P(E/H) > P(E), and this holds if and only if P(E/H) > P(E/¬H). Therefore, it is suf-
ficient for the PR-confirmation of H by E that H is positively relevant to E. For ex-
ample, if an infection H increases the probability of fever E, then the fever supports 
the hypothesis of infection. This allows us to generalize (1) from universal theories H 
with deductive consequences to cases of probabilistic theories with inductive conse-
quences.
If inductive explanation is defined by the positive relevance condition, i.e., by requir-
ing that the explanatory theory H increases the probability of data E (see Niiniluoto and 
Tuomela 1973), then we have the general result:
(2)  If hypothesis H deductively or inductively explains evidence E, then E PR-con-
firms H.
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This is a generalized form of the condition CE* for the relation of explanation and confir-
mation. Indeed, if the second premise of Peirce’s schema (PA) is understood to require that 
theory H deductively or inductively explains E, then (PA) can be interpreted as stating the 
principle (2) of abductive confirmation.The same result about indirect confirmation holds 
of course for successful predictions E from a hypothetical theory H. The strength of the 
quantitative Bayesian treatment is thus its ability to account by (1) and (2) for the most 
central qualitative principles CE and CE* of abductive confirmation and their extension to 
cover probabilistic settings.
The basic result (2) can be refined by introducing quantitative degrees of explanatory 
power and degrees of confirmation, with the aim of showing comparatively that better ex-
planations receive stronger confirmation (see Niiniluoto 1999b). The first measure of ex-
planatory power of theory H with respect to evidence E was defined by Hempel in 1948 as
expl1(H,E) = P(¬H/¬ E)
(see Hempel 1965). Here E may be a conjunction of several empirical statements. Hempel 
derived this measure as the ratio between the common information content of H and E 
(i.e., 1-P(HvE)) and the content of E (i.e., 1-P(E)).Another information-theoretic defini-
tion, due to Jaakko Hintikka (1968), is
expl2(H,E) =
 
P(E/H) – P(E)
1 – P(E)
.
Measure expl2(H,E) is an improvement of the simple ratio measure P(E/H)/P(E) (see 
M cGrew 2003) or its logarithm (see Good 1960), which remain constant when an irrel-
evant proposition E’ is added to the explanandum E (see Schupbach and Sprenger 2011). 
This criticism does not hit expl2, since expl2(H,E&E’) < expl2(H,E) in case P(E’/E&H) = 
P(E’/E) ≠ 1. The proposal of Schupbach and Sprenger (2011) is structurally similar to the 
Kemeny – Oppenheim measure of “factual support”:
expl3(H,E) =
 
P(H/E) – P(H/¬E)
P(H/E) + P(H/¬E)
.
All of these three measures receive the maximal value one if H deductively explains (the 
whole of) E, so that they can primarily be used for the comparison of non-deductive expla-
nations. Such non-deductive explanations may include partial deductions, where H entails 
most but not all conjuncts of E, or inductive inferences from a probabilistic theory H. Fol-
lowing Hempel, these formulas are called measures of systematic power, when the capacities 
of a theory to give successful explanations and predictions are combined.
The simplest definition of degrees of confirmation, related to the High Probability crite-
rion, is posterior probability:
conf1(H/E) = P(H/E).
The difference and ratio measures are related to the Positive Relevance criterion:
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conf2(H/E) = P(H/E) – P(H)
conf3(H/E) =
 
P(H/E)
P(H)
 = P(E/H)
P(E)
conf4(H/E) = log P(H/E) – log P(H).
(See Kuipers 2000). Variants of these definitions include I.J. Good’s 1950 measure of 
“weight of evidence” log P(E/H) – log P(E/¬H)(cf. Good, 1960) and J. Kemeny’s and 
P. Oppenheim’s 1952 measure for “the degree of factual support” (cf. Foster and Mar-
tin 1966). All of these measures satisfy the requirement that confirmation increases when 
the evidence is more surprising or improbable. Fitelson (1999), who himself favors Good’s 
weight of evidence, notes that an important virtue of the difference measure conf2(H/E), 
in comparison to the ratio measure conf3(H/E), is that evidence gives strongest support to 
a minimal explanation, i.e., only to the part of an explanatory hypothesis H that is relevant 
to the explanation of the evidence E.
Relating these measures gives results like the following. If H explains E better than K in 
the sense of expl2 or expl3, then conf3(H/E) > conf3(H/E) and conf4(H/E) > conf4(H/E). 
If H explains E better than K in the sense of the expected value of expl1, then conf2(H/E) > 
conf2(K/E) (see Niiniluoto 1999a, 187).
Peircean abduction (PA) is often treated as a rule of inference rather than as a principle 
of confirmation. In selective abductive reasoning, the potential explanations H in (PA) are 
compared to each other, and the best one is chosen. The measures of explanatory power al-
low us to define the best explanation of evidence E as that hypothesis H which maximizes 
expl(H,E). Thereby selective abduction can be expressed by an acceptance rule which ten-
tatively recommends inference to the best explanation:
(IBE)  A hypothesis H may be inferred from evidence E if H is the best explanation of 
E among all the rival hypotheses.
As a qualification to the rule IBE, one may require that the best explanation should be suf-
ficiently good (see Lipton 2001, 104). Otherwise, suspension of judgment is the most ra-
tional option before new evidence is gathered by observation and experimentation.
The results (1) and (2) are compelling also to anti-realists, who like van Fraassen and 
Laudan admit that theoretical hypotheses have truth values, as soon as they accept the 
probabilistic Bayesian framework. However, one way of denying that empirical success is 
truth-conducive is to assume that all scientific theories have zero probability: if P(H) = 0, 
then P(H/E) = 0 for any evidence E (see van Fraassen, 1989). But this choice of prior prob-
ability is dogmatic in the sense that no evidence whatsoever can change it, so that the gen-
eral recommendation to choose P(H) = 0 for all theories H is an expression of dogmatic 
theoretical anti-realism.
The concept of probable approximate truth allows treatments of cases where the prior 
probability of a hypothesis H is zero.4 For example, H may be a sharp hypothesis with 
measure zero, but still its probable approximate truth may be larger than zero.
4 For this concept, see Niiniluoto (1987), p. 280. The probability of a hypothetical theory H relative to our 
background knowledge may be zero also in cases, where H is an idealization with counterfactual presup-
positions or has known counterexamples. Such cases can be handled with the concept of truthlikeness.
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Peirce was not a Bayesian, as he wanted to analyze induction and abduction by means 
of probabilities as truth-frequencies instead of degrees of belief. Some philosophers of sci-
ence, like Stathis Psillos (2009), take abduction and IBE as valid principles which need no 
probabilistic justification (cf. discussion by Iranzo 2007). Gerhard Schurz (2008a) defends 
abduction as a mode of inference with some value in justification, but rejects the Bayesian 
approach as being unable to demarcate scientifically worthwhile hypotheses from pure 
speculations.
To show that Bayesian incremental confirmation is too easy, Schurz (2008b) considers 
the God’s will hypothesis
(G-E) God wants E, and whatever God wants, happens.
where E is any empirical phenomenon. As G-E deductively entails E, by (1) E PR-confirms 
G-E, even though G-E is purely speculative and should not receive any scientific confirma-
tion. This argument raises many intricate issues that belong to the philosophy of religion. 
Some religious thinkers, most notably Richard Swinburne (2004), have applied Bayesian 
confirmation theory to the hypothesis that God exists. If H is the hypothesis of theism, and 
E states the existence of a complex physical universe (or the orderliness of the universe, the 
existence of consciousness, etc.), he argues that P(E/H) > P(E/¬H), which implies that E 
PR-confirms H. Further, according to Swinburne, the hypothesis that God has all the su-
pernatural powers (like omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection) is simpler and 
hence initially more probable than any rival hypothesis, which implies that P(H/E) > ½, 
i.e., H receives HP-confirmation from the total evidence E. So the Bayesian approach is in-
deed flexible enough to reconstruct the thinking of a religious person who sees divine prov-
idence everywhere and thereby finds confirmation for his or her faith. Here one may recall 
that confirmation is a weak epistemic concept which does not yet guarantee that a hypoth-
esis is acceptable as true – especially when a natural explanation as a rival to G-E is available 
(Niiniluoto 2008). But I think there are good reasons to agree with Schurz that G-E should 
not receive any scientific confirmation. However, this does not require that Bayesianism is 
rejected, as Schurz pleads, since a Bayesian can block the confirmation of such speculative 
religious hypothesis by giving them zero prior probability. This move need not be based 
on dogmatic atheism, but rather with inherent difficulties with a hypothesis like G-E. All 
theologians would not accept that evil events and miseries happen by God’s wishes, so that 
they would exclude the explanation of such events by G-E. There are famous arguments 
to show that an unrestricted notion of omnipotence is inconsistent - for example, could 
God create a stone so heavy that even He could not lift it? (See Grim 2006.) Already me-
dieval scholastics who accepted divine foreknowledge attempted to avoid fatalism by deny-
ing that God’s knowledge causes future events. Further, a Bayesian, who takes seriously the 
idea of abductive confirmation, might accept that G-E entails E, but deny that G-E explains 
E, since it includes an ad hoc assumption that God wants E – and hence there is no genuine 
confirmation of G-E in the sense of (AC).
4. The Virtue of Unification
We are now ready to consider whether the Bayesian approach is able to justify the criterion 
of theoretical or causal unification. In other words, is it possible to prove that a hypothesis 
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which explains many different kinds of phenomena has stronger confirmation than a hy-
pothesis which explains only one kind of phenomenon? Can the Whewellian idea of “con-
silience of inductions” be justified in Bayesian terms? Or are there other interesting notions 
of unification which as theoretical virtues are rewarded by empirical confirmation? The an-
swers to all of these questions turn out to be affirmative.
One natural proposal is to regard a theoretical explanation the better, the more em-
pirical phenomena it explains, and the less new entities or principles it postulates. There 
is a trade-off between these desiderata, as new consequences may be achieved by adding 
assumptions and thereby making the theory more complex.This idea was formulated al-
ready by Eino Kaila in his Finnish monograph Inhimillinen tieto in 1939 with his notion 
of “relative simplicity”.5 According to Kaila, a theory has scientific value only to the extent 
that the multiplicity of its explanatory principles is smaller than the multiplicity of facts of 
experience that can be derived from it. Thus, the relative simplicity of theory H is the ra-
tio between the multitude of empirical data E derivable from H and the number of logi-
cally independent basic assumptions of H. In modern terms, this definition can be stated 
as the ratio between the explanatory power of H and the complexity of H. Kaila, who had 
written in 1926 a monograph on Wahrscheinlichkeitslogik but had thereafter become scep-
tical about the possibility of quantitative inductive logic, further suggested that this ratio 
would be equal or at least proportional to the inductive probability of H given the data E, if 
it were measurable. His guess was not quite correct: when Hempel defined in 1948 the first 
formal measure of explanatory or systematic power of a theory H relative to evidence E, its 
value turned out to be P(¬H/¬ E) rather than P(H/E).6 But Kaila’s important point was 
that relative simplicity in some way indicates the truth or epistemic acceptability of a the-
ory, and is not only a pragmatic or conventional virtue in theory preference. Thus, his no-
tion of relative simplicity can be viewed as a generalization of Whewell’s consilience of in-
ductions.
For example, Newton’s mechanics has high relative simplicity in Kaila’s sense, since the 
law of gravitation explains many different kinds of phenomena (such as orbits of planets, 
free fall near the Earth, pendulum, etc.). On the other hand, the religious hypothesis G-E 
would have minimal relative simplicity in Kaila’s sense, since for each empirical statement 
E it requires the ad hoc premise that God wants E. Kitcher (1989) says that G-E achieves 
“spurious unification”, but in fact it would be better to say that it does not yield any kind of 
unification.
One problem with measures of explanatory power like expl1(H,E) and expl2(H,E) is 
that they receive their maximal value one when H is a contradiction – recall that a contra-
diction entails all statements.7 This a reason why Laudan (1977) proposes that the prob-
lem-solving ability of a theory H should be measured by the weighted number of solved 
empirical problems (which corresponds to expl1(H,E)) subtracted with the number of 
“conceptual problems” (such as inconsistency). Laudan’s proposal is clearly a variant of 
Kaila’s notion of relative simplicity (see Niiniluoto 1999a, 167, 182).
5 Kaila’s early treatment of unification was mentioned by Niiniluoto (1999a, 182), but it has remained 
largely unknown among philosophers of science, since its English translation had to be waited for 75 
years (see Kaila 2014).
6 See measure expl1(H,E) in Section 3, cf. Hempel (1965).
7 Note that expl3(H,E) is undefined, when H is a contradiction.
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Kaila applied his ratio measure n/m to the case of curve-fitting, where a curve runs 
through n observation points and can be determined by m points (e.g. m = 2 for a 
straight line, m = 3 for a circle, etc.). But in the general case Kaila did not have the logi-
cal tools to measure the complexity of a theory. As the difficulties in the explication of 
the notion of complexity show (cf. Foster and Martin 1966), it is not easy to give a pre-
cise account of counting the number of the “logically independent basic assumptions” 
of a theory.8 An attempt in this direction was made by Michael Friedman (1974) in his 
notion of a partition of a sentence or a set of sentences into its “atomic” parts, but his 
proposal was refuted by Philip Kitcher (1977). Kitcher suggested that instead of count-
ing the number of independent laws one should consider “the repeated use of a small 
number of types of laws which relate a large class of apparently diverse phenomena”. This 
idea was worked out in Kitcher (1981): a theory achieves “unifying power” by “gener-
ating a large number of accepted sentences as the conclusions of acceptable arguments 
which instantiate a few stringent patterns”.
A more sophisticated way of analysing a belief system into a conjunction of its “relevant 
elements” by using the machinery of relevance logic is given by Gerhard Schurz and Karel 
Lambert (1994), who allow deductive, approximate and inductive unification in their ac-
count of scientific understanding. Their treatment avoids Friedman’s (1974) problem that 
the conjunction of two separate theories (e.g. Kepler’s laws and Boyle’s law) should not count 
as unification. Success of unification, which “goes hand in hand” with success in realistic truth 
approximation, increases with the weighted number of “actually and potentially assimilated 
phenomena” and decreases with the number of “basic and dissimilated phenomena” (see also 
Schurz 1999). Again we have a variant of Kaila’s ratio measure of relative simplicity.9
Another way of analysing unified theories in terms of structures rather than state-
ments is given by the structuralist school (see Balzer, Moulines, and Sneed 1987). Theories 
are represented as nets of theory-elements <M,I>, where M is a class of structures and I is 
a set of intended applications. Such theory-nets linked with a specialization relation look 
very much like Whewell’s inductive tables. But the difference to Whewell’s consilience and 
other realist accounts of unification is the instrumentalist spirit of this approach, as it de-
nies that theories have truth values and thus could be confirmed by their empirical success.
Let us return to the question of independent testability. With the formal machinery of 
Bayesian epistemic probabilities, one can give a simple and straightforward argument about 
the Whewellian situation where theory H deductively explains two independent phenom-
ena E and E’ (see Niiniluoto 2008).
Let E1, E2, ..., En be repeated occurrences of the phenomenon E, and let E(n) be their 
conjunction. Suppose that H logically entails E(n), so that P(E(n))/H) = 1. Then by (1) ev-
idence E(n) PR-confirms H. But repetitions of the same kind of evidence give diminishing 
returns, since by inductive learning the (n+1)st occurrence of E is more probable than its 
earlier occurrences: P(En+1/E(n)) > P(En+1) = P(E1) (see Howson and Urbach 1989, 82). 
8 This is also illustrated by the debate of Myrwold (2003) and Schurz (2008b) on the comparison of the 
Ptolemaic and Copernican theories in astronomy.
9 To give one more variant, Dean Peters (2014), who defends “selective scientific realism”, formulates 
his “unification criterion of confirmation” by the requirement that a theoretical posit should be re-
garded as (approximately) true if it entails more accepted empirical propositions than are required to 
construct it.
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Now suppose further that H logically entails another phenomenon E’ which is probabilisti-
cally independent of E, i.e., P(E’/H) = 1 and P(E’/E) = P(E’). It follows from these condi-
tions that P(H/E(n)&En+1) < P(H/E(n)&E’) iff P(E’) < P(En+1 /E(n)). The last condition 
holds under quite broad conditions, e.g., if the initial probabilities P(E) and P(E’) are about 
the same magnitude. Hence, relative to E(n), new kind of evidence E’ gives more confirma-
tion to H than old kind of evidence En+1. This argument, which is valid for all confirma-
tion measures from conf1 to conf4, thus proves that successful explanation of the new kind 
of phenomenon E’ gives more confirmation to theory H than the repetition of the old kind 
of phenomenon E.
Another important result about unification is proved by Wayne C. Myrwold (2003). 
Suppose that theory H achieves inductive systematization between empirical propositions 
E and E’ (cf. Niiniluoto and Tuomela 1973). This means that E and E’ are probabilistically 
independent, but they are informationally relevant to each other given H:
(3) P(E’/E) = P(E’) and 1 > P(E’/E&H) > P(E’/H).10
Myrwold proposes to measure the degree of unification of E and E’ achieved by H by means 
of the difference
(4) U(E,E’;H) = log P(E’/E&H)
P(E’/H)
 – log P(E’/E)
P(E’)
.
It follows that U(E,E’;H) > 0 if H achieves inductive systematization between E and E’. 
Similarly, U(E,E’;H) > 0 if H achieves deductive systematization between independent E 
and E’ and H alone does not entail E’, since then we have P(E’/E) = P(E’) and 1 = P(E’/
E&H) > P(E’/H) (cp. (3)).Then Myrwold argues, by applying the logarithmic ratio meas-
ure of confirmation conf4, that the degree of confirmation of H by E&E’ can be divided 
into three additive parts: confirmation of H by E, confirmation of H by E’, and the degree 
of unification of E and E’ achieved by H:
(5) conf4(H/E&E’) = conf4(H/E) + conf4(H/E’) + U(E,E’;H).
Myrworld notes that a similar result about the “virtue of unification” can be proved if conf4 
is replaced with Good’s weight of evidence.
10 As an alternative to (3), one may require that H together with E is positively relevant to E’. i.e., 
1 > P(E’/H&E) > P(E’). These notions of inductive systematization avoid the transitivity paradox 
mentioned at the end of Section 2. They are motivated by Hempel’s suggestion in 1958 that theoreti-
cal concepts could be logically indispensable for inductive systematization. Hempel had noted that de-
ductive systematization by a theory H (i.e., H&E’CE and not E’CE) can always be achieved by an ob-
servational subtheory of H. As a way out of this “theoretician’s dilemma”, he proposed that inductive 
systematization might behave differently. Niiniluoto and Tuomela (1973) prove that Hempel’s guess 
was right: theoretical concepts may be logically indispensable for inductive systematization. Niiniluoto 
(1973) argues that a theory, which does not have any non-tautological deductive observational con-
sequences and therefore has a Ramsey-sentence which is logically true in second-order logic, may still 
achieve inductive systematization among observational statements. Raatikainen (2012) repeats this ar-
gument, and uses it against the thesis of some structural realists that Ramsey sentences exhaust the cog-
nitive content of theories.
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Essentially the same result is proved by Timothy McGrew (2003), p. 562. Assume that 
H1 and H2 are equally good explanations of E and E’, i.e., P(H1) = P(H2), P(E/H1) = P(E/
H2), and P(E’/H1) = P(E’/H2). Assume further that H1 achieves inductive systematization 
between E and E’ in the sense of (3), but E and E’ are independent conditional on H2, i.e., 
P(E/E’&H2) = P(E/H2). Then a direct calculation by Bayes’s Theorem shows that P(H1/
E&E’) > P(H2/E&E’). Hence, by all of our measures of confirmation, the theory H1 which 
unifies E and E’ gains more confirmation by evidence E&E’ than the theory H2 without 
such unifying power. McGrew illustrates this analysis by the example, where two quasar im-
ages are observed to have identical spectrums (E and E’), and this coincidence is explained 
by the lensing hypothesis (H) that the gravitational field of a massive object has bent the ra-
diation stemming from a single quasar; in this case, E and E’ become dependent relative to 
H, i.e. P(E&E’/H) is much larger than P(E/H) P(E’/H).
These results are related to the issue whether “coherence” is truth conducive. The in-
tuition that a coherent set of beliefs has a high probability of being true may arise from 
the controversial coherence theory of truth. Some Bayesians have given impossibility 
proofs against the proposal that coherence of evidence would increase the support for 
the hypothesis (see Bovens and Hartmann 2003; Olsson 2005). Tomoji Shogenji (2013) 
argues convincingly that some of the expectations of Bayesian coherentists have been 
wrong-headed, since it is the diversity of evidence that strengthens the support for the 
hypothesis. Shogenji’s (1999) own measure of coherence for statements E1, …, En is de-
fined by
Coh(E1, …, En) = 
P(E1 & ... & En)
P(E1) ... P(En)
,
and the conditional coherence of E1, …, En given H is obtained by relativizing these prob-
abilities to H:
Coh(E1, …, En/H) = 
P(E1 & ... & En/H)
P(E1/H) ... P(En/H)
.
Now, applying the ratio measure of confirmation conf3, we have
conf3(H/E1&…&En) = 
conf3(E1/H) ... conf3(En/H)Coh(E1, ..., En/H)
Coh(E1, ..., En)
.
But this equation can be rewritten as
(6) conf3(H/E1&…&En) = 
conf3(H/E1) ... conf3(H/En)Coh(E1, ..., En/H)
Coh(E1, ..., En)
,
which shows that the confirmation H by E1, …,En can be expressed as the product of 
the confirmation of H by each Ei, i = 1,…n, and the increase of the coherence of E1,…,En 
by H. By taking logarithm of both sides of (6), this equation reduces to Myrwold’s re-
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sult (5). In fact, the result (6) can be found already in Myrwold’s earlier article (see Myr-
wold, 1999, 663).
Marc Lange (2004) has presented objections to Myrwold’s treatment of unification 
(see also Schurz, 2008b). With examples from physics and cosmology, Lange argues that 
Myrwold’s unification is in some cases “too easy” to achieve. It is correct that formulas like 
(4) and (5) cannot reflect the question whether the unifying theory H is lawlike and ex-
planatory or ontologically and causally prior to statements E and E’, and one could develop 
a more restricted notion of unification with these additional conditions (cf. (1) and (2)). 
But this does not yet discredit the Bayesian analysis of the virtue of unification.
Lange also points out that, for any independent E and E’, the simple conditional E → E’ 
unifies E and E’ in Myrwold’s sense: U(E,E’;E → E’) > 0, since P(E’/E&(E → E’)) = 1 and 
P(E’/(E → E’)) is smaller than 1. To avoid this technical objection, one can require that the 
unifying theory H should be logically independent of E’ and E. This is in fact required in 
the definition (3) of inductive systematization.11
Myrwold (2003), p. 410, notes that on his account the conjunction E & E’ of 
two independent statements E and E’ does not unify them: U(E,E’;E&E’) = 0, since 
P(E/E&E’) = P(E’/E&E’) = 1. It is appropriate that this kind of trivial unification is ex-
cluded. But it may be somewhat surprising that, for similar reasons, Whewell’s consilience 
of inductions is excluded as well (see ibid., p. 418): if theory H entails both E and E’, which 
are independent of each other, then by (4) the degree of unification U(E,E’;H) is zero, 
since P(E’/E&H) = P(E’/H) = 1.12
Deductive consilience by Newton’s theory does not show that e.g. Kepler’s and Gali-
leo’s empirical laws are rendered informationally relevant to each other. On the contrary, 
these laws K and G are probabilistically irrelevant to each other given the unifying theory 
N, since P(G/N) = P(G/K&N) = P(K/N) = 1.
A different probabilistic example with a similar conclusion is given by Lange (2004). 
Let H be the hypothesis that Jones has a disease called systemic lupus erythematosus, and 
let E state that Jones has pleuritis and E’ that Jones has a malar rash. Lange specifies the 
probabilities so that pleuritis E and malar rush E’ are positively relevant to each other, but 
given lupus H, these symptoms E and E’ are independent of each other. Still, E and E’ are 
separately positively relevant to H and also jointly positively relevant to H, so that E&E’ 
strongly PR-confirms H. Indeed, using terminology from Hans Reichenbach’s account of 
probabilistic causality, lupus is a common cause which “screens off” its probabilistic effects 
from each other. More generally, variable Z screens off variable X from variable Y iff X and 
Y are probabilistically dependent but become independent when conditionalized on Z (see 
Schurz 2008a, 344). Myrwold’s U(X,Y;Z) has a negative value in such cases. But, as we just 
saw, even in these cases a Bayesian treatment of the PR-confirmation of the common cause 
is available.
The outcome of our discussion is that there are two quite different concepts of unifica-
tion, both of them legitimate with important applications in science. One of them is link-
11 See also footnote 1 on conditional deductive confirmation.
12 Myrwold (2003) proposes to account for consilience by the idea that, in a law with free parameters, the 
values determined from one class of phenomena agree with those determined from another class. This 
is systematically illustrated in William Harper’s (2011) treatise on Newton’s method.
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ing up13: two empirical phenomena are independent from each other, but given a theory 
they become positively relevant to each other. This idea covers the notions of deductive 
and inductive systematization and Myrwold’s measure of unification.
The second is screening off: two empirical phenomena or variables are positively rele-
vant or even indifferent to each other, but given a theory they become independent of each 
other.14 This idea covers Whewell’s deductive account of consilience, Kaila’s relative sim-
plicity, and both deterministic and probabilistic common causes.
In both cases, the unifying theory or common cause receives probabilistic confirmation 
from empirical phenomena. This shows that Bayesianism can give a successful account of 
abductive confirmation both for linking up and screening off.
5. Concluding remark on approximate unification
The empirical success of scientific theories in explanation and prediction is often approxi-
mate: theory H entails a statement which is only “close” to the observed evidence E.15 In 
such cases, H and E are strictly speaking incompatible, so that P(E/H) = 0. For the same 
reason, probabilistic measures of conditional coherence like Coh(E1, …, En/H) and degree 
of unification like U(E,E’;H) are not well-defined in the case of approximate unification. 
New conceptual tools are therefore needed, if we wish to extend the Bayesian account of 
abductive confirmation to cases of approximate unification.
But do theories receive abductive confirmation from their approximate empirical suc-
cess? Ordinary Bayesian probabilities cannot handle this question. Theo Kuipers (2000) 
gives a comparative methodological treatment, based on his “Success Theorem”: if theory 
H is at least as close to complete truth as theory H’, then H is at least as empirically success-
ful as H’ relative to correct data. This justifies a “Rule of Success”: if H has so far been em-
pirically more successful than H’, then eliminate H’ in favor of H.
Another approach is to replace the posterior probability P(H/E) with the notion of 
expected truthlikeness ver (H/E) of a theory H given empirical evidence E (see Niiniluoto, 
1987). This notion differs from epistemic probability P(H/E), since ver(H/E) can be high 
even in cases where H and E are in conflict with each other. Then the notion of confirma-
tion as increase of probability can be replaced with the notion of ver-confirmation or in-
13 Schurz (2015) uses this term in his treatment of unification by means of causal nets. (The paper was 
presented in the symposium on coherence and unification in Düsseldorf in January 2014.) If X, Y, 
and Z are random variables, then linking up means that X and Y are statistically independent but de-
pendent relative to Z. For example, if X is the angle of the sun, Y is the length of a tower, and Z is the 
length of its shadow, then INDEP(X,Y) but for a fixed value of Z the values of X and Y determine 
each other.
14 In the notation of Schurz (2015), X and Y are screened off by Z iff DEP(X,Y) and INDEP(X,Y/Z). 
Here Z may be a common cause of X and Y (e.g. X is barometer reading, Y is coming storm, and Z is 
atmospheric pressure) or Z may an intermediate cause of X and Y (e.g. X is a light switch, Y is a light 
bulb, and Z is electric current). Schurz notes that deterministic common causes “trivially” screen off 
their effects.
15 For illustrations, see Popper (1963), p. 62; Hempel (1965), p. 344; Hintikka (1992); and Niiniluoto 
(2014).
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crease of the expected truthlikeness of H by E. At the same time, abduction (PA) or IBE 
should be generalized to a rule which recommends us to regard the best available explana-
tion as truthlike rather than true:
(IBT)  If hypothesis H is the best explanation of evidence E, conclude for the time be-
ing that H is truthlike.
(see Kuipers, 2000; Niiniluoto, 2005). IBT allows approximate explanations, and 
the strength of instances of this pattern of argument can be measured by the value 
ver (H/E).
To generalize the results of Section 4, one should then show that the degree of approx-
imate unification of theory H with respect to evidence increases our expectation that H is 
truthlike. This task is left to another paper.
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